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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/NIC

FROM: Graham E. Fuller, VC/NIC

SUBJECT: Uncongenial Intelligence for the Policymakers

1. Lebanon. During the Lebanon crisis we produced three estimates which consistently pointed out that the Lebanese army--as reconstituted by the US--would not hold in a crunch. These estimates also regularly pointed out that the key goals of administration policy--the creation of Lebanese nationalist unity, the expulsion of Syria from Lebanon, and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon--were not attainable. While these judgments were delivered with no particular joy, they were depressingly accurate.

2. India. The Intelligence Community was far more realistic about the negative intentions of India under Indira Gandhi toward Pakistan and the Pak nuclear weapon than policymakers at State wished to hear. In the event, Indira was killed and the Indians backed away from a potentially serious clash between India and Pakistan.

3. Pakistani Nuclear Efforts. [redacted] consistently dismaying to those who had hoped that the Pakistanis would not pursue the bomb and did not welcome [redacted] they are in fact working toward such a weapon. Our analyses furthermore suggest that they remain intent on this goal.

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-- Informal NIC memos have also consistently raised the prospect that Pakistan is probably the weak reed of US-Afghanistan policy and remains potentially vulnerable down the road. This assessment is inconvenient to proponents of an increased role for Pakistan against Afghanistan.

4. The Peace Process. Estimates and NIC memos have consistently been quite negative about prospects for the peace process and particularly sharp in warning about the potential for violence in the region should the US begin to move toward success. While not wishing to be at all negative about the value of the peace process, I believe these memos and estimates have served to raise certain realities to the policymaker:

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- The PLO will almost surely not accept negotiations with Israel short of major change in US policy toward the PLO.
- That Hussein will not go along in negotiating with Israel without the PLO.
- Syria will remain implacably hostile to any US peace plan.


5. Egypt. The Intelligence Community has been consistently darker about Egypt's prospects than the State Department has been comfortable with.

6. Lebanese Shia. The Intelligence Community has been far more accurate in predicting the growth and development of radical Shiism in Lebanon than State Department has.

7. Libya. The Intelligence Community has been far more cautionary about the limited impact of US political, economical [redacted] measures against the Libya regime than policymakers would like to hear.

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8. Israel's Power. The Intelligence Community has consistently argued that Israel's military power is far greater and more secure than most Congressional activists and some in the Administration would like to believe.


Graham E. Fuller

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